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CORRECTING DEADLY CONFUSION: 
RESPONDING TO JURY INQUIRIES 
IN CAPITAL CASES 
Stephen P. Garoeyt 
Sheri Lynn Johnsontt 
& Paul Marcus! 
INTRODUCTION 
When members of a capital jury ask the trial judge to clarify a 
sentencing instruction, chances are good they didn't understand the 
instruction. Why else would they have asked the question? Moreover, 
the trial judge might think it best to clarify matters. 
However, the judge presiding over Lonnie Weeks's capital mur-
der trial thought differently. The jurors there asked whether they 
were required to sentence Weeks to death if they believed his crime was 
heinous, or if they believed Weeks himself constituted a continuing 
threat to society. The answer, as a matter of law, is no.I But rather 
than answering the question, or otherwise making sure the jurors un-
derstood the point, the trial judge simply told them to go back and 
reread the instruction-the very same instruction that prompted their 
question in the first place. The jury sentenced Weeks to death. 
Weeks appealed. He worked his way through the Virginia courts 
on direct appeal,2 and then through the federal courts in habeas 
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corpus proceedings. 3 He lost at every step, including his last one in 
the U.S. Supreme Court.4 
How could Weeks have lost? When the members of a capital sen-
tencing jury say that they don't understand a critical instruction, 
shouldn't the judge be required to answer them with something more 
than a directive to go back and read the same instruction one more 
time? The courts have thought not. The Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, concluded that the jury probably did understand the law, despite 
its question. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
five-member majority, Weeks "ha[d] demonstrated only that there ex-
ist[ed] a slight possibility that the jury considered itself precluded 
from considering mitigating evidence."5 
Here, we put this conclusion to the test. We use the results of a 
mock jury study to examine how well jurors who are given the sentenc-
ing instructions actually used in Weeks understand the relevant consti-
tutional principles. We also examine what, if any, difference it would 
have made if the judge had given a clarifying instruction, instead of 
simply telling the jurors to go back and re-read the original instruc-
tion. 6 Part I describes the facts of Weeks in more detail. Part II 
presents the results of our study. Part III uses these results to explain 
how trial courts-the Supreme Court's decision in Weeks notwithstand-
ing-should respond when faced with a capital jury's request for clari-
fication of a critical sentencing instruction. 
I 
W.EEKS v. ANGELONE 
A Vtrginia jury convicted Lonnie Weeks of "capital murder."7 
Weeks had been the passenger in a stolen car when State Trooper Jose 
Cavazos pulled the car over for speeding. Cavazos ordered Weeks out 
of the car. As Weeks exited, he shot Cavazos six times, killing him. 
According to Weeks, the shooting was on impulse. But the jury didn't 
3 See Weeks v. Angelone, 4 F. Supp.2d 497 (E.D. Va. 1998), dismissed, 176 F.3d 249 
(4th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000). 
4 See Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000). 
5 ld. at 734 (emphasis omitted). 
6 For a discussion of the methodological limitations of such studies, see, for example, 
Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Phase: Legal As-
sumptions, Empirical Findings, and a Research Agenda, 16 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 185, 190-92 
(1992) (reviewing advantages and disadvantages of simulation studies), andjoel D. Lieber-
man & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 
PSYCHOL., PuB. PoL'Y, & L. 589, 591-96 (1997) (discussing methodological limitations of 
research on jury instruction process). 
7 "Capital murder" under Vrrginia law includes the "willful, deliberate, and premedi-
tated killing of a law-enforcement officer." VA. ConE ANN. § 18.2-31(6) (Michie Supp. 
1999). 
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believe him. The real issue at trial was punishment: Should Weeks be 
sentenced to life imprisonment or death? 
Weeks presented a wide range of evidence in mitigation: Weeks 
was twenty-years old when he shot Trooper Cavazos. He'd grown up 
in a poor and violent neighborhood in Fayetteville, North Carolina. 
His father died when he was ten; his mother, an addict, was unable to 
care for or discipline him. Weeks nonetheless stayed out of trouble, 
thanks largely to the support of a strong and loving grandmother, to 
the time and energy he devoted to high-school basketball, and to his 
church, which he attended regularly.8 But when Weeks graduated 
from high school, his girlfriend told him she was pregnant, and all 
that changed. As Weeks testified, "I was involved with a young lady ... 
and she was pregnant ... and I didn't want to leave her .... "9 Weeks 
turned down the college athletic scholarships he had received, moved 
in with his girlfriend, and stopped going to church. In time, he began 
selling marijuana with other young men from his neighborhood. He 
was eventually arrested for selling drugs, pleaded guilty, and received 
a three-year suspended sentence with five years probation.10 The 
events leading to the murder of Trooper Cavazos followed. 
When the presentation of evidence at the penalty phase of the 
trial was over, the judge read the jury four separate instructions.11 
One of these-Instruction No. 2-would later assume center stage in 
the case. It read in full: 
You have convicted the defendant of an offense which may be 
punished by death. You must decide whether the defendant shall 
be sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life and a fine of a 
specific amount, but not more than $100,000. Before the penalty 
can be fixed at death, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt at least one of the following two alternatives: 
1. That, after consideration of his history and background, 
there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of 
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society; or 
2. That his conduct in committing the offense was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it in-
volved depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim 
beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of 
murder. 
8 This rendition of the facts is taken from testimony presented at the penalty phase 
of the trial. See Penalty Phase Trial Record at 62-175, Commonwealth v. Weeks, Crim. No. 
33170 (Prince William County Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Trial Record-Oct. 21] 
(on file with authors). 
9 ld. at 67 (testimony of Lonnie Weeks). 
10 See id. at 72 (testimony of Lonnie Weeks). 
11 For the full set of instructions, see infra Appendix IV. 
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If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt either of the two alternatives, 
and as to that alternative you are unanimous, then you may fix the 
punishment at death or if you believe from all the evidence that the 
death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of 
the defendant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for live [sic] 
and a fine of a specific amount, but not more than $100,000.00. 
If the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt at least one of the alternatives, then you shall fix the punish-
ment of the defendant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for 
live [sic] and a fine of a specific amount, but not more than 
$100,000.00.12 
Weeks claimed on appeal that the jury, due to an erroneous un-
derstanding of Instruction No. 2, had disregarded the evidence he 
had presented in mitigation. 
Instruction No. 2 is no stranger to the Supreme Court. The in-
struction is part of the pattern set of instructions given in most, if not 
all, Virginia death-penalty trials. Indeed, the Supreme Court upheld 
this very instruction against a facial challenge two years ago. In 
Buchanan v. Angelone,I3 the petitioner argued that Instruction No. 2 
was unconstitutional because it contained no language explaining the 
meaning of mitigation, nor did it explain the circumstances under 
which a capital jury could determine that death was not warranted. 
Instruction No. 2, the petitioner in Buchanan complained, was thus a 
poor vehicle for impressing upon the jury the role and meaning of 
mitigation in the context of a capital-trial penalty phase. The Court 
disagreed, holding that Instruction No. 2 "did not foreclose the jury's 
consideration of any mitigating evidence."14 
But the jury in Weeks, unlike the jury in Buchanan, expressly asked 
the judge for clarification, sending the judge the following question 
during its deliberations: 
If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr., is guilty of at least one of 
the alternatives, then is it our duty as a jury to issue the death pen-
alty? Or, must we decide (even though he is guilty of one of the 
alternatives) whether or not to issue the death penalty or one of the 
life sentences? What is the [R]ule? Please claruy.I5 
Instruction No. 2 should already have provided the answer to this 
question, but apparently it hadn't. 
12 Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727, 730 n.l (2000). 
13 522 u.s. 269 (1998). 
14 ld. at 277. 
15 Penalty Phase Trial Record at 63-64, Commonwealth v. Weeks, Grim. No. 33170 
(Prince William County Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Trial Record-Oct. 22] (on 
file with authors). 
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Faced with the jury's question, the defense asked the court to "in-
struct the jury that even if they find one or both of the mitigating 
factors-I'm sorry, the factors that have been proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, that they may still impose a life sentence, or a life sentence 
plus a fine."16 The judge rejected the defense request and responded 
instead with the following notation at the bottom of the jury's inquiry: 
See second paragraph oflnstruction #2 (Beginning with "If you 
find from ... etc.")_l7 
In other words, the judge simply told the jury to go back and read the 
instruction, which the judge had already read to them once and which 
the jurors had had in their possession (together with the three other 
instructions) while they had been deliberating. 
A couple of hours later, the jury sentenced Weeks to death, find-
ing that his "conduct in committing the offense [was] outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved depravity or 
mind and/ or aggravated battery .... "18 The court reporter noted 
that "a majority of the jury members [were] in tears"19 as they deliv-
ered their verdict. 
Weeks claimed on appeal that the jurors who sentenced him to 
death didn't fully understand that they could and should consider all 
the mitigating evidence he presented, and that the judge's actual re-
ply to their question did little, if anything, to dispel that confusion. At 
least some of the jurors, Weeks argued, thought the law required them 
to sentence him to death if they believed his crime was heinous, or if 
they believed Weeks himself constituted a continuing threat to society, 
no matter what mitigating evidence he presented. Under these cir-
cumstances, he submitted, the trial court was obliged to clarify the 
instruction. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. Relying on its earlier decision in 
Buchanan, the Court assumed that the instructions in Weeks, including 
Instruction No. 2, were constitutionally sufficient.20 Indeed, the 
Court emphasized that Weeks was actually better off than Buchanan 
insofar as the Weeks jurors, but not the Buchanan jurors, had been 
I d. 
16 Id. at 65. 
17 Juror's Second Question to Judge (Oct. 22, 1993) (on file with authors). 
18 Trial Record-Oct. 22, supra note 15, at 66-67. The full verdict form read: 
[W]e the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant Lonnie 
Weeks, Jr., guilty of capital murder, and having unanimously found that his 
conduct in committing the offense [was] outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhumane, in that it involved depravity of mind and[/] or aggra-
vated battery, and having considered the evidence in mitigation of the of-
fense, unanimously fi.x his punishment at death .... 
19 Trial Record-Oct. 22, supra note 15, at 67. 
20 Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727, 732 (2000). 
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given a separate and specific instruction-Instruction No. 4-on the 
meaning of mitigation.21 
Still, as the dissenters in Weeks pointed out, a juror certainly could 
have misconstrued Instruction No. 2, even if she had also been given 
Instruction No. 4.22 Instruction No. 2 starts out by defining the two 
possible aggravating factors and explaining the state's burden of 
proof. 23 It next says that if the jury members unanimously find that 
the Commonwealth has met its burden, "then you may fix the punish-
ment at death or if you believe from all the evidence that the death 
penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defen-
dant at life imprisonment .... "24 Like the Weeks dissenters, we too 
suspect that this clause contains the confusion that prompted the 
jury's question. 
Under what circumstances should a juror conclude that the 
death penalty is "not justified"? As the Weeks dissenters explained, the 
answer is unclear because the instruction is ambiguous. 25 According 
to one interpretation, a juror might think that she is initially supposed 
to decide if the state has proven the existence of one of the two aggra-
vating circumstances and only then decide whether the death penalty is 
or is not justified based on all the evidence, including the evidence in 
mitigation. Alternatively, a juror might think she is supposed to con-
sider all the evidence, including the evidence in mitigation, but only 
insofar as it relates to the state's success or failure in proving the exis-
tence of one of the aggravating circumstances, with death being re-
quired if the state has successfully carried its burden. The first 
reading is constitutional; the second is not. 
In short, a juror certainly could have read the instruction in the 
way Weeks suggested. But that still leaves the real question: Would a 
reasonable juror have misinterpreted the instruction in this way, espe-
cially where, as in Weeks, the jury asked for clarification and the judge 
said in reply to go back and reread the original instruction? The 
21 See id. 
22 See id. at 735 (Stevens,J., dissenting). 
23 See infra Appendix IV. 
24 ld. 
25 See Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 739 (Stevens,]., dissenting). The dissent in Weeks, echoing 
the dissent in Buchanan, suggested that lawyers might understand Instruction No. 2 better 
than nonlawyers. See id. at 736 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Our data provide some support for 
that hypothesis. When we conducted the experiment on second- and third-year Cornell 
law students enrolled in a course on criminal procedure, students who received the instruc-
tions-and nothing more-misunderstood the law almost as much as did the mock jurors 
who also received nothing more than the instructions. Forty-three percent of the students 
misunderstood the relevant legal principle, compared to 44% of the mock jurors. How-
ever, when the students were told to reread the instruction, their level of misunderstanding 
dropped dramatically-falling to 23%-whereas the level of misunderstanding among the 
mock jurors actually increased-climbing to 49%. 
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Supreme Court thought not. But the evidence, to which we now turn, 
points to the opposite conclusion. 
II 
TESTING W.EEES 
Did the jury in Weeks understand the law or not? In order to an-
swer this question, the m<Yority and the dissent in Weeks each looked 
at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the jury's inquiry. But 
they interpreted these circumstances very differently. The m<Yority 
concluded that, when all was said and done, only a "slight possibil-
ity''26 existed that the jury's members were confused; the dissent con-
cluded that confusion was a "virtual certainty."27 Each side looked at 
the same set of facts, but relying only on common sense and intuition, 
drew from those facts contradictory conclusions. 
We wanted more to go on than common sense and intuition: 
Hence our experiment. Of course, no experiment can tell us what the 
actual jurors in Weeks did or did not understand, but our results none-
theless provide an empirical basis upon which to assess the particular 
facts of the case. We find that the Weeks dissenters were probably 
right. The jury that condemned Lonnie Weeks to death probably con-
tained several members who did not understand the law; it would 
likely have contained fewer confused members if the trial judge had 
given a simple and direct answer to the jury's question. 
A. Designing the Test 
We placed an ad in local newspapers in Williamsburg and New-
port News, VIrginia. Respondents were death-qualified by tele-
phone.28 A total of 154 members of the two communities eventually 
participated in mock sessions held on three separate days. Seventy-
26 Jd. at 734 (emphasis omitted). 
27 Jd. at 735 (Stevens,J., dissenting). 
28 A state may exclude a veniremember from service on a capital case, if he or she 
would be unable or unwilling to impose a death sentence under any circumstances. See 
Witherspoon v. illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968) ("[A] sentence of death cannot be car-
ried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen 
for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed 
conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction."). This process is called "death-
qualification." If a state chooses to exclude veniremembers on this basis, as Virginia does, 
then it must likewise exclude jurors who would impose the death penalty in all capital 
cases. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (holding that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a capital defendant to challenge for cause 
any prospective juror who "will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case ... 
[and who will therefore] fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do"). This process is called 
"life-qualification." In actual capital trials, death- and life-qualifications are accomplished 
through voir dire. 
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five percent of the participants were college students,29 seventy per-
cent were between eighteen and twenty-one years old, seventy-three 
percent were female, and seventy-four percent were white. 
We designed our experiment to replicate as closely as possible the 
facts in Weeks. 30 All jurors were given a one-page summary of the facts 
in Weeks, which researchers read aloud as the jurors followed along. 
Researchers told the jurors to assume that Weeks had been convicted 
of capital murder. The only remaining issue, which each juror was 
told he or she would individually be asked to decide,31 was Weeks's 
sentence: death or life imprisonment. Researchers then read aloud 
the actual sentencing instructions used at trial, though-consistent 
with Virginia practice-the jurors were not yet provided with a copy of 
the instructions. 
The jurors were next given a one and a half page statement re-
flecting a summary of the prosecutor's closing arguments in the pen-
alty phase of the case, as well as a one and a half page summary of 
defense counsel's closing. Both statements, drawn from the actual 
trial transcript, were read aloud to the jurors as they followed along. 
The previously read jury instructions were then handed out, together 
with the five separate verdict forms used in the case: (1) death based 
on future dangerousness; (2) death based on heinousness; (3) death 
based on heinousness and future dangerousness; ( 4) life imprison-
ment; and (5) life imprisonment plus a fine to be determined by the 
jury. Researchers read aloud each of the verdict forms, with the jurors 
again following along. 
The jurors were sorted into three separate groups. One group 
received the jury instructions, but was not told to assume that any-
thing out of the ordinary had happened during the course of the 
jury's deliberations (no-question group). A second group received 
the jury instructions, but was in addition told to assume that the jury 
asked the judge a question about the instructions. The group's mem-
bers were then presented with and read the actual question asked in 
Weeks, along with the judge's actual reply (actual-reply group). A third 
group of jurors received the jury instructions and, like the second 
group, was told to assume that the jury had asked the judge a question 
29 Most of these participants, if not all, were enrolled in the College of William and 
Mary or Christopher Newport University. 
30 The documents used in connection with the experiment are reproduced infra Ap-
pendices I-VI. 
31 We did not ask the jurors to deliberate. The effect of deliberation on how well 
jurors understand instructions is less than clear. Compare Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve 
Heads Better Than One?, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBS., Autumn 1989, at 205, 218 (suggesting 
based on intensive case studies of 18 mock juries that the "deliberation process works well 
in correcting errors of fact but not in correcting errors of law"), with Lieberman & Sales, 
supra note 6, at 596 ("[I]n many of the studies where judicial instructions are effective, the 
mock jurors engaged in group deliberations." (citation omitted)). 
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about the instructions. Like the second group, the third group was 
presented with and read the question asked in Weeks, only this time 
the jurors were presented with and read the following reply, which we 
crafted from the actual defense request (requested-reply group): 
Even if you find that the State has proved one or both of the 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, you may give effect 
to the evidence in mitigation by sentencing the defendant to life in 
prison.32 
The jurors were asked to select a verdict, after which the verdict 
forms and all other materials were collected. The jurors were then 
asked two sets of questions. The first set collected basic demographic 
data: sex, race, age, and religious affiliation. The second set asked 
several questions designed to test how well the jurors understood a 
few basic and well-established constitutional rules governing their de-
liberations, 33 including the rule that a capital juror is never required to 
impose a death sentence, no matter what facts she finds in 
aggravation. 
B. Analyzing the Results 
Two of our comprehension questions focused directly on the is-
sue troubling the jury in Weeks. One question asked: "Mter hearing 
the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to impose a 
death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks's conduct was 
heinous, vile, or depraved?" The second question asked: "Mter hear-
ing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to im-
pose a death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks would be 
dangerous in the future?" A juror who answered "yes" to either ques-
tion would, assuming she was true to her beliefs and followed the law 
as she understood it, ignore a defendant's mitigating evidence once 
she concluded that the evidence proved either heinousness or 
dangerousness. 
Table 1 presents the aggregate results. Altogether, fifty-nine per-
cent of the 154 jurors answered the first question "no," which is the 
correct response. As a matter of law, capital jurors are never required 
to impose a death sentence, no matter how heinous the crime or dan-
gerous the defendant. 34 But forty-one percent gave the wrong answer: 
32 See infra Appendix VI. 
33 Each of these questions was taken verbatim from questions used in the Capital jury 
Project (CJP), thus facilitating comparisons benveen the results of our mock study and the 
results already emerging from the nationwide efforts of the CJP. See infra note 37 and 
accompanying text. 
34 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[l]n 
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment 
requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process 
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TABLE 1 
juROR CoMPREHENSION-MANDATORY SENTENCING 
(%responding) 
Mter hearing the instructions, did you believe that the 
law required you to impose a death sentence if the 
evidence proved that Mr. Weeks's conduct was heinous, 
vile, or depraved? 
Mter hearing the instructions, did you believe that the 
law required you to impose a death sentence if the 
evidence proved that Mr. Weeks would be dangerous in 
the future? 
Yes 
41 
Yes 
38 
No 
59 
No 
62 
100% 
(n=154) 
100% 
(n=154) 
"yes." Much the same goes for the second question. Sixty-two percent 
of the jurors answered "no," which is again the correct response. But 
that still leaves thirty-eight percent who answered the second question 
incorrectly. Both results are troubling. 
If, as the Court concluded in Buchanan, no reasonable juror 
would have misunderstood Instruction No. 2,35 then a disturbing 
number of our jurors failed to act reasonably. Reasonable jurors, ac-
cording to the Buchanan Court, would not have thought Instruction 
No. 2 required them to impose a death sentence, even if they found 
that the defendant was death-eligible because the state had proven 
either heinousness or dangerousness. But that's exactly what thirty-
eight to forty-one percent of our mock jurors did believe. Buchanan 
would call these jurors unreasonable. The alternative conclusion, of 
course, is that these jurors were simply confused. 
One might argue that mock jurors, not being real jurors, pay 
comparatively less attention to sentencing instructions. But data from 
of inflicting the penalty of death." (citation omitted)); see also McKoy v. North Carolina, 
494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (concluding that the state's "unanimity requirement impermissi-
bly limit[ed] jurors' consideration of mitigating evidence and hence is contrary to our 
decision in Mills"); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) ("Under our cases, the 
sentencer must be permitted to consider all mitigating evidence."); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 
481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (holding that sentencing judge's refusal "to consider[] evi-
dence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances ... did not comport with the requirements 
of Skipper v. South Carolina, Eddings v. Oklahoma, and Lockett v. Ohio" (citations omitted)); 
Skipper v~ South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) ("The sentencer may not refuse to consider 
or be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence." (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) ("Just as 
the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, 
neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating 
evidence."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("[A]n individu-
alized decision is essential in capital cases."). 
35 See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1998). 
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real capital jurors suggest otherwise.36 The nationwide Capital Jury 
Project (CJP) interviewed hundreds of jurors from several different 
states, asking each juror a wide range of questions about the trial on 
which they sat, including the same two questions we asked the jurors 
in our study. 37 The CJP results, based on a sample of some 650 jurors 
from seven different states, are much the same as ours.38 Forty-one 
percent of the CJP jurors erroneously believed that the law required 
them to impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that the de-
fendant's crime was heinous, vile, or depraved,39 the same percentage 
as our mock jurors. Likewise, thirty-t'l.vo percent of the CJP jurors er-
roneously believed that the law required them to impose a death sen-
tence if the evidence proved that the defendant would be dangerous 
in the future,4° a figure comparable to our thirty-eight percent.41 
36 Cf. Lieberman & Sales, supra note 6, at 592 (citing 1992 study suggesting that the 
"findings of empirical studies on comprehension are representative of actual juror 
comprehension"). 
37 For a description of the Capital jury Project, see William]. Bowers, The Capital Jury 
Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. LJ. 1043 (1995). 
Quantitative analyses of GJP data to date can be found in W!lliam J. Bowers et al., 
Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and 
Premature Decision Making, 83 CoRNEu. L. REv. 1476 (1998) (multistate data); W!lliam J. 
Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and 
Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REv. 605 (1998) (multistate data); Theodore 
Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CoRNEu. L. 
REv. 1599 (1998) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry?] (South Carolina data); 
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An Empirical Study, 44 
BuFF. L. REv. 339 (1996) (South Carolina data); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, 
Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CoRNEu. L. REv. 1 (1993) (South 
Carolina data); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do 
Jurors Think?, 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 1538 (1998) [hereinafter Garvey, Jurors] (South Carolina 
data); Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
(forthcoming Apr. 2000) [hereinafter Garvey, Emotional Economy] (South Carolina data); 
James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Mis-
guided?, 70 IND. LJ. 1161 (1995) (North Carolina data); Marla Sandys, Cross·Overs-Capital 
Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 
70 IND. LJ. 1183 (1995) (Kentucky data); Benjamin D. Steiner et al., Folk Knowledge as Legal 
Action: Death Penalty Judgments and the Tenet of Early Release in a Culture of Mistrust and Puni-
tiveness, 33 L. & Soc'v REv. 461 (1999) (multistate data); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury 
and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CoRNEu. L. 
REv. 1557 (1998) [hereinafter Sundby, Absolution] (California data); and Scott E. Sundby, 
The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 
VA. L. REv. 1109 (1997) (California data). 
Qualitative analyses of GJP data to date can be found in Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where'$ 
the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. LJ. 
1137 (1995) (Indiana data); Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital 
Trials: The VU!W from the Jury, 70 IND. LJ. 1103 (1995) (Georgia data). 
38 See Bowers, supra note 37, at 1091 tbl.7. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 The following Table compares responses from jurors in the nationwide Capital jury 
Project with those from jurors in our mock study: 
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1. Does Clarification Improve Comprehension? 
According to the Weeks majority, the chance that the jury might 
have misunderstood Instruction No. 2 was remote. In all likelihood, 
the Court concluded, the jurors fully understood what they were sup-
posed to do. Consequently, the Court had no occasion to ask what 
difference, if any, it would have made if the trial judge had simply and 
directly answered the jury's question. Nonetheless, our results suggest 
a big difference. 
Table 2 shows the responses of our first two groups of jurors: the 
no-question group, which received the pattem instructions alone and 
the actual-reply group, which received the pattem instructions, the 
jury's question, and the judge's response telling them to reread the 
instruction. If we look at these two groups together-all the jurors 
whose on!J guidance was the same as that which the actual Weeks jurors 
received-nearly half of them (forty-seven percent) believed that Vir-
ginia law required them to impose a death sentence if the evidence 
proved that Weeks's conduct was heinous, vile, or depraved. Nearly 
half of the members of these same two groups (forty-six percent) like-
wise believed that the law required them to impose a death sentence if 
the evidence proved that Weeks would be dangerous in the future. 
Moreover, simply directing the jurors to reread the pattem in-
struction did nothing to improve their comprehension. Jurors who 
heard the realjury's question and who were directed to look at the 
original instruction were at least as likely to believe that they were re-
quired to impose a death sentence if they found an aggravating factor 
Juror Comprehension-Mandatory Sentencing 
Capital jury Project jurors v. Weeks Mock jurors 
(% responding) 
After hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to impose a death 
sentence if the evidence proved that [the defendant's] conduct was heinous, vile, or 
depraved? 
Capital Jury Project Jurors 
Weeks Mock jurors 
Fisher's exact test P=0.928 
Yes 
41 
41 
No 
58 
59 
99% 
(n=655) 
100% 
(n=154) 
After hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to impose a death 
sentence if the evidence proved that [the defendant] would be dangerous in the future? 
Capital Jury Projectjurors 
Weeks Mock Jurors 
Fisher's exact test P=0.183 
Yes 
32 
38 
No 
67 
62 
98% 
(n=652) 
100% 
(n=53) 
NoTE: Data for Capital jury Project jurors were taken from William]. Bowers, The Capital jury 
Praject: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. LJ. 1043, 1091 tbl. 7 (1995). 
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TABLE 2 
JUROR COMPREHENSION-MANDATORY SENTENCING 
No QUEsTION v. ACTUAL REPLY 
(%responding) 
639 
Mter hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to 
impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks's conduct was 
heinous, vile, or depraved? 
No question 
Actual reply 
Fisher's exact test jJ=0.694 
Yes 
44 
49 
No 
56 
51 
100% 
(n=50) 
100% 
(n=53) 
Mter hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to 
impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks would be 
dangerous in the future? 
No question 
Actual reply 
Fisher's exact test jJ=l.OOO 
Yes 
46 
45 
No 
54 
55 
100% 
(n=50) 
100% 
(n=53) 
as were jurors who heard the instruction only once. Indeed, simply 
referring jurors back to the original instruction actually resulted in a 
five percentage point increase in the number of jurors who thought 
they were required to impose death if the evidence proved Weeks's 
conduct was heinous, vile, or depraved, which was in fact the aggravat-
ing factor the real Weeks jury ended up returning. 
In contrast, the requested reply to the jury's question in Weeks 
dramatically increases comprehension. As Table 3 shows, among ju-
rors who were made aware of the jury's question and who received a 
clarifying answer, only twenty-nine percent believed that the law re-
quired them to impose death if they found heinousness, compared to 
forty-nine percent among those who were directed back to the origi-
nal instruction. The results for future dangerousness are similar. 
Among jurors who received a clarifying instruction, only twenty-four 
percent continued to believe that a death sentence was mandatory if 
they found that the defendant would be dangerous in the future. In 
other words, a clarifying instruction would have corrected the misun-
derstanding among forty percent of the othenvise confused jurors. 
Moreover, these results are statistically significant under traditional 
measures. Differences this extreme are very unlikely to be the result 
of chance. 
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TABLE 3 
JUROR COMPREHENSION-MANDATORY SENTENCING 
ACTUAL REPLY v. REQUESTED REPLY 
(% responding) 
Mter hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to 
impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks's conduct was 
heinous, vile, or depraved? 
Yes No 
Actual reply 49 51 100% 
(n=53) 
Requested reply 29 71 100% 
(n=51) 
Fisher's exact test p:=0.047 
Mter hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to 
impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks would be 
dangerous in the future? 
Yes No 
Actual reply 45 55 100% 
(n=53) 
Requested reply 24 76 100% 
(n=51) 
Fisher's exact test p:=0.024 
2. Does Improved Comprehension Influence Sentencing? 
Does a juror's belief that she must return a death sentence if she 
finds heinousness have any influence on the sentence she imposes? 
The answer will undoubtedly depend on the strength of the case at 
hand. Where the evidence in favor of death is extremely weak or ex-
tremely strong, improved comprehension probably wouldn't change 
the verdict of most jurors. In extremely weak cases, many jurors 
wouldn't find an aggravating factor in the first place and thus would 
never even reach the death-selection question; in extremely strong 
cases, most jurors would probably vote for death whether or not they 
believed that the law required them to do so. 
In closer cases, understanding the instruction might well make all 
the difference. Weeks is such a case. The victim was a state trooper, 
which conventional wisdom and public opinion polls suggest would 
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be highly aggravating.42 But Weeks was young;43 the killing itself was, 
according to the defense, done on impulse;44 and Weeks expressed 
remorse for his wrongdoing.45 Indeed, the very fact that the Weeks ju-
rors, many of whom wept as they announced their verdict, asked for 
clarification suggests that some of them were prepared to change 
their vote one way or the other, all depending on what the judge said 
in reply. In all likelihood, the outcome for some jurors turned on 
what they believed the law required of them. The facts alone were 
indeterminate. Neither life nor death was the obvious choice. 
Table 4 examines the relationship, based on the facts in Weeks, 
between a juror's understanding of the relevant legal rule and the 
sentence he voted to impose. 
Jurors who understood the rule were in fact more likely to vote 
for life compared to jurors who misunderstood the instruction. 
Although our small sample size failed to yield statistically significant 
results, improved understanding does nonetheless appear to influ-
42 CJ. Samuel R Gross, Update: American Public opinion on the Death Penalty-It's Getting 
Persona~ 83 CoRNELL L. REV. 1448, 1466 tbl.4 (1998) (indicating that 75% of public-opin-
ion poll respondents favored the death penalty for the "[m]urder of a police officer"). But 
cJ. DAVID c. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL jUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENAL'IY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 319 tbl.52 (1990) (finding based on multiple regression analysis of capital sen-
tencing in Georgia that the fact that the "[v]ictim was a police or corrections officer on 
duty" produced a "[d]eath-[o]dds [m]ultiplier" of 1.7 whereas several other aggravating 
circumstances, at least some of which are intuitively less aggravating, produced even higher 
death-odds multipliers); Garvey, Jurors, supra note 37, at 1556 (concluding based on CJP 
interviews with 153 South Carolina jurors that "[m]urders involving child victims are highly 
aggravating, but otherwise jurors claim that the victim's status and standing make little 
difference" as to how they would vote (emphasis omitted)). 
43 See Trial Record-Oct. 21, supra note 8, at 62 (testimony of Lonnie Weeks) (testi-
fying that he was age 21 at the time of trial); cJ. Garvey, Jurors, supra note 37, at 1559 tbl.4, 
1564 (reporting based on interviews with 153 CJP jurors from South Carolina that 42% 
believed the fact that the "defendant was under 18 at the time of the crime" would make 
them less likely to vote for death); id. at 1576 tbl.IO (reporting similar results based on 
interviews with 1017 CJP jurors from 12 different states). 
44 See Trial Record-Oct. 21, supra note 8, at 84-85 (testimony of Lonnie Weeks); cJ. 
Garvey, Jurors, supra note 37, at 1555 tbl.2 (reporting based on interviews with 153 CJP 
jurors from South Carolina that 55% believed the fact that a "killing was committed under 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" would make them less likely to 
vote for death); id. at 1575 tbl.IO (reporting similar results based on interviews with 1017 
CJP jurors from 12 different states). 
45 See Trial Record-Oct. 21, supra note 8, at 97-99 (testimony of Lonnie Weeks); cf. 
Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry?, supra note 37, at 1637 (concluding based on CJP study 
of South Carolina jurors that "remorse makes a difference to the sentence a defendant 
receives-provided jurors do not think the crime is too vicious"); Garvey, Jurors, supra note 
37, at 1560 (concluding based on CJP interviews with 153 South Carolina jurors that 
"[l]ack of remorse is highly aggravating" (emphasis omitted}); Sundby, Absolution, supra 
note 37, at 1596 (concluding based on CJP study of California jurors that "[t]he more 
evidence that the jury can find indicating the defendant's acceptance of responsibility for 
the killing, the more likely the jury will return a life sentence"). 
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TABLE 4 
CoMPREHENSioN-SENTENCING CoRRELATIONS 
(% responding) 
Life Death 
Understood death is not required even if heinousness 63 37 
is proven 
Believed death is required if heinousness is proven 52 48 
Fisher's exact test j1=0.245 
Understood death is not required even if future 62 38 
dangerousness is proven 
Believed death is required if future dangerousness is 53 47 
proven 
Fisher's exact test j1=0.313 
100% 
(n=91) 
100% 
(n=63) 
100% 
(n=95) 
100% 
(n=59) 
ence the sentencing verdict.46 Among jurors who understood that 
death was not required even if heinousness was proven, sixty-three per-
cent voted for a life sentence, whereas the corresponding figure 
dropped to fifty-two percent among those who believed that death was 
required. The results were similar for future dangerousness. Of the 
jurors who understood the rule, sixty-two percent voted for life; of the 
jurors who did not understand the rule, only fifty-three percent voted 
for life. 
III 
DECIDING WEE!i:S 
The results of our study, read in light of the prevailing doctrine, 
suggest that Weeks should have come out the other way. 
A. What Do the Data Mean for Weeks? 
Some capital sentencing jurors will be confused no matter how 
they are instructed. Indeed, some of this confusion may not really be 
confusion at all. It may instead simply reflect a juror's own conviction 
that any defendant who is "death eligible"-any defendant guilty of 
46 For studies finding a correlation between sentencing outcome and improved com-
prehension based on instructions rewritten in accordance with research in linguistics and 
jury decision making, see Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on 
Death by Revising and Testing jury Instructions, 79JumCATURE 224, 231 (1996) (finding based 
on study of 170 jury-eligible citizens that jurors who received revised instructions "were less 
likely to lean toward the death penalty than jurors who received the pattern instructions 
(51 percent versus 66 percent)"), and Richard L. Wiener eta!., Comprehensibility of Approved 
Jury Instructions in Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 455, 463 (1995) (concluding 
based on mock jury study of 173 jury- and death-eligible Missouri residents that "partici-
pants who were less confused about the jury instructions (i.e., those who scored higher on 
the comprehension survey) were least likely to impose the death penalty on the 
defendant"). 
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aggravated murder-should for that reason alone be sentenced to 
death. 
Not all error, however, is beyond repair. On the contrary, our 
results suggest that a simple answer to the jury's question in Weeks 
would have eliminated forty percent of the error. Moreover, a forty-
percent reduction in the error rate will often tip the balance, from a 
jury in which the majority of members are confused to a jury in which 
the m~ority are not. When the court leaves the question unanswered, 
as it did in Weeks, one would expect on average that half of the jury 
will wrongly believe that they are required to impose death if they find 
the crime to be heinous, vile, or depraved. In contrast, when the 
court gives a clarifying instruction, that number dwindles from 
around six down to three or four. 
Indeed, these average figures may well underestimate the number of 
jurors on the actual jury in Weeks who misunderstood the law, and thus 
the number of jurors who could have benefitted from a clarifying in-
struction. The fact that the Weeks jury asked the question at all sug-
gests that many of its members had collapsed the distinction between 
death-eligibility and death-selection, wrongly thinking the law re-
quired that they condemn any death-eligible defendant, only because 
he is death-eligible. Likewise, the fact that the Weeks jurors had raised 
the question sua sponte-rather than having us raise it for them, as we 
did for our mock jurors-suggests that the clarification would have 
had more influence on the real Weeks jurors than on our mock jurors. 
In short, the Weeks jury probably had more confused members than 
the average jury would have had. 
No one can say how many of the jurors who actually sat on the 
Weeks jury would have voted differently if the judge had given a clarify-
ing instruction. Our analysis nonetheless suggests that a correct un-
derstanding of the law could very well have made the difference 
between life and death. Again, we would predict an even greater ef-
fect where, as in Weeks, the jury's deliberations had come to focus on 
the particular instruction to which the request for clarification was 
specifically addressed. An instruction is most likely to prompt a re-
quest for clarification when the jury's verdict somehow turns upon it. 
Consequently, if the Weeks jurors had understood that the law never 
requires death, a unanimous verdict in death's favor would, we think, 
have been unlikely. 
B. The Web of Case Law 
When a Virginia jury asks what Instruction No. 2 means, the best 
way to ensure that its members understand the law is to give them a 
clarifying instruction. According to our data, merely directing jurors 
back to Instruction No. 2 does nothing to remedy the widespread mis-
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understanding that death must follow as a matter of law if the Com-
monwealth has proven one of the two statutory aggravating 
circumstances. Thus, the better practice is not to tell the jurors to go 
back and reread the instructions, but rather to answer the question, 
unless doing so would introduce prejudice or distraction. 
Of course, the Constitution rarely requires the better practice 
simply because it is better. In this case, however, the jury's misunder-
standing went to a basic constitutional rule goveming capital sentenc-
ing. 47 If VIrginia had wanted to enact a rule condemning all death-
eligible defendants, it could not constitutionally have done so. The 
Eighth Amendment outlaws mandatory death penalties, because they 
fail to allow for particularized consideration of the character and rec-
ord of each convicted defendant.48 Accordingly, when a jury mistak-
enly believes that it must in effect follow such a rule, Virginia should 
not be allowed to capitalize on that mistake. Allowing it to do so is 
little more than a roundabout way for the state to "treat[ ] all persons 
convicted ofa designated offense not as uniquely individual human 
beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be sub-
jected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death."49 
VIrginia could not enact a rule condemning all death-eligible de-
fendants as a matter of law. Nor could it empanel a juror who be-
lieved all death-eligible defendants should be condemned and for 
whom mitigating evidence would therefore be irrelevant. "Any juror 
to whom mitigating factors are ... irrelevant," the Court held in Mor-
gan v. Illinois, 5° "should be disqualified for cause."51 It makes no sense 
to exclude a juror who says during voir dire that his own beliefs re-
quire him to condemn every death-eligible defendant, but then to 
tum a blind eye to a juror who says he believes that the law requires 
him to do the same thing. Indeed, the juror in Morgan came to court 
already believing that all death-eligible defendants deserve death; the 
jurors in Weeks did not. The Commonwealth's own sloppy instructions 
encouraged that misapprehension, and the Commonwealth, once made 
47 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
48 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("The 
mandatory death penalty statute in Woodson was held invalid because it permitted no con-
sideration of 'relevant facets of the character and record of the individual.'" (quoting 
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion))). 
49 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion). 
50 504 u.s. 719 (1992). 
51 ld. at 739. Morgan and the Woodson-Lockett line of cases point in the same direction, 
not coincidentally. As the majority opinion in Morgan points out, Justice Scalia's dissenting 
view "may best be explained by his rejection of the line of cases tracing from Woodson v. 
North Carolina and Lockett v. Ohio, and developing the nature and role of mitigating evi-
dence in the trial of capital offenses, [as can be seen by examining justice Scalia's dissent-
ing opinions in favor of] a view long rejected by this Court." Morgan, 504 U.S. at 736 
(citations omitted). 
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aware of the effects of its negligence, did nothing to correct the prob-
lem. On the contrary, it exploited the jury's mistake. The state's con-
duct in Weeks was therefore more culpable, not less, than the state's 
conduct in Morgan. 
Moreover, requiring courts to give clarifying instructions in re-
sponse to requests for such clarification hardly requires the courts to 
get routinely involved in the business of rewriting capital sentencing 
instructions. The jurors in Weeks were confused about a critical rule 
governing their deliberations. They asked a question. They hoped 
the answer would clarify the rule. Their question alerted the trial 
judge to the fact that they had not understood the instruction and at 
the same time gave him an opportunity to remedy their confusion. It 
would have taken the judge no longer to answer their question than it 
took him to refer them back to the original instruction. Under these 
limited circumstances, the risk that the jurors' misapprehension of 
the law "infected [the defendant's] capital sentencing [was] unaccept-
able in light of the ease with which that risk could have been 
minimized."52 
Consider by way of analogy the Supreme Court's plurality opin-
ion in Simmons v. South Carolina. 53 Relying on public opinion surveys 
and CJP data showing that jurors dramatically underestimated the 
length of time a defendant would serve in prison if sentenced to life 
imprisonment instead of death,54 the Simmons plurality held that a 
jury must be instructed on a defendant's statutory ineligibility for pa-
role, provided future dangerousness was an issue in the case. 55 The Court 
reasoned that the state violates due process when it "create[s] a false 
dilemma by advancing generalized arguments regarding the defen-
dant's future dangerousness while, at the same time, preventing the 
jury from learning that the defendant never will be released on pa-
role."56 In Simmons, the prosecutor's argument signaled and helped 
create an unacceptable risk that the jury's decision making would be 
distorted. In Weeks, the jury's question signaled-and the state's con-
fusing instruction helped create-the existence of a similar and simi-
larly unacceptable risk. 
52 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted); 
accord Morgan, 504 U.S. at 736. 
53 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
54 See id. at 170 & n.9 (collecting public opinion and juror surveys). 
55 See id. at 156 (holding "that where the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, 
and state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the 
sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible"). 
56 Id. at 171. 
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Of course, some jurors will consider future dangerousness even if 
the prosecutor doesn't argue it.57 Likewise, many jurors believe that 
they are required to impose a death sentence even when they ask no 
question. 58 Nonetheless, when a specific and readily identifiable rea-
son exists to believe that a capital sentencing jury may have been mis-
led-whether, as in Simmons, by a prosecutor's argument that 
promotes a false impression of the facts or, as in Weeks, by a question 
from the jury which shows that its members have misinterpreted and 
misunderstood the law-due process requires the state to fix the mis-
impression it has created, rather than exploit it. 
Indeed, in at least one respect, the case for a narrowly tailored 
rule in Weeks is even stronger than the case for such a rule in Simmons. 
In Simmons, one must infer from the prosecutor's argument a likeli-
hood that the jury will focus on future dangerousness and that a mis-
taken belief about parole may influence the jury's decision; in Weeks, 
no such inference is necessary, because the jury's question itself di-
rectly signals both the existence of a misunderstanding and the impor-
tance of the subject of that misunderstanding to its decision. 
CoNCLUSION 
The jurors who sentenced Lonnie Weeks to death did not under-
stand the law. They asked the trial judge for help. Based on our 
mock study, the answer he gave probably did precious little good. 
Consequently, when the jurors voted to condemn Weeks, some of 
them probably still didn't understand the law and continued to think 
that they had to vote for death. Yet no capital juror is ever required to 
vote for death. The Supreme Court upheld Weeks's death sentence 
nonetheless. But the Court's judgment is ultimately based on nothing 
more than instinct and conjecture. Sadly, the evidence presented 
here leads to one conclusion: The Court got this one wrong, both on 
the facts and on the law. 
57 See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 37, at 671 (reporting that the data "show[ ] that 
the greater tendency of jurors who underestimate the alternative to vote for death is not 
restricted to cases in which the defendant is alleged to be dangerous, nor indeed to de-
fendants they thought were proved to be dangerous or whose possible return to society 
greatly concerned them"). 
58 Cf. Bowers, supra note 37, at 1091 tbl.7 (indicating that 41% of 655 jurors from 
seven different death-penalty states responded "yes" when asked: "Mter hearing the judge's 
instructions, did you believe that the law required you to impose a death sentence if the 
evidence proved that the [d]efendant's [c]onduct [w]as [h]einous, [v]ile, or [d]epraved" 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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APPENDIX I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
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The defendant, Lonnie Weeks, is 20 years old. Along with others, 
Weeks burglarized a home in North Carolina while the owners were 
not present. He found keys to a car, which he stole. Weeks then 
bought a gun, which had been used in another murder that Weeks 
had no involvement in. There was testimony that Weeks bought the 
gun because he planned to kill a man with whom he had quarreled 
about selling drugs, but Weeks himself said that he had not been in-
volved in selling drugs, and only bought the gun to defend himself. 
About two weeks later, Weeks drove the car from the place where the 
burglary had been committed to Washington D.C. There was testi-
mony from one of his friends that Weeks planned to sell or trade the 
car for drugs, but Weeks said that he went to visit family members. No 
drugs or large amounts of money were ever found in his possession. 
On the way back from Washington, Weeks was a passenger in the 
stolen car, which Weeks's uncle was driving. A VIrginia state trooper, 
Jose Cavazos, was parked in a marked police car, monitoring traffic by 
radar, when he determined that the car Weeks was riding in was 
speeding. The officer activated his emergency lights and chased the 
vehicle, bringing it to a stop after a brief distance. 
As Trooper Cavazos approached the car on the left side, he asked 
the driver, Weeks's uncle, to step out of the car. After the driver got 
out, Cavazos asked Weeks to step out of the car. As Weeks got out of 
the car, he was carrying a gun, which he fired five or six times. Two of 
the bullets hit Trooper Cavazos, who died within minutes. 
Weeks and his uncle drove away from the scene and parked at a 
nearby service station. They realized that the uncle's driver's license 
was still at the scene of the crime, and Weeks returned on foot to 
retrieve it. He ran part of the way, then walked down the ramp where 
another state trooper was already investigating what had happened. 
After pretending to help, Weeks got the driver's license and rejoined 
his uncle. 
The police found Weeks and his uncle in the parking lot of a 
motel, and after a preliminary investigation of the scene, questioned 
them both. Four hours later, the uncle told the police that Lonnie 
Weeks had shot the Trooper. The police then arrested Weeks, who 
later that day confessed that he had shot the Trooper. Weeks also 
wrote a letter to a jail officer admitting the shooting and expressing 
remorse over it. 
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APPENDIX II 
PROSECUTOR'S REAsONS FOR IMPOSING A SENTENCE 
OF DEATH 
I don't ask for a death sentence lightly, but there are so many 
victims in this case: Trooper Cavazos himself, his two children, all of 
the police officers from whom you've heard who grieve him, as well as 
the kids to whom Lonnie Weeks was selling drugs. Lonnie Weeks's 
grandmother, who raised him in the church and raised him to do 
right, is also a victim. Lonnie may have grown up poor, but he had 
the guidance of his grandmother and a coach. He had talent as an 
athlete too, but that's not what he chose. And he did have a choice-
his sister, who grew up in the same household, is not a criminal. He 
was on probation, and the judicial system had given him a chance, but 
that is not what he chose. He has always chosen to do what is good for 
himself-and he doesn't care about anybody else. 
They showed you pictures of Lonnie Weeks's children, but he is 
not a family man. He fathered two children by two different women, 
and abandoned them both, and he has provided almost no support 
for his children. His character witnesses talked about what a good 
person Mr. Weeks was, that he was not violent, but they were talking 
about the person he used to be. In the year and a half since he gradu-
ated from high school, he has done just about every kind of crime you 
can think of except rape. He has been a burglar and a drug dealer, 
and he bought a gun from a murderer, planning to kill someone in a 
drug turf war, somebody who had hit him in the head with a gun. 
And now, instead of killing another drug dealer, he has murdered a 
State Trooper. 
He could have thrown the gun out the window, but instead, he 
shot Jose Cavazos, an older "Pop"-type Trooper, when all Trooper 
Cavazos did was to politely ask him to get out of the car. He shot him 
six times. One shot would have killed him. But six times-that was 
not just fear; he was determined to kill him. And that was aggravated 
battery. But if that were all he had done, I probably would not be 
asking you to sentence him to death. But that isn't all. Then Lonnie 
Weeks got up on the stand and lied about what happened. He is a 
liar, and he is dangerous. 
He lied about what he bought the gun for-you heard testimony 
from his friend, his "business" associate, that Lonnie Weeks was going 
to kill a man over a drug dispute. But Lonnie Weeks claims he wasn't 
selling drugs and claims he was going to wait for the man he argued 
with to shoot at him first. He claims he panicked, but he went back to 
get the license, went back in cold blood. He wasn't so upset that he 
ran all the way; no, he slowed down before the people at the scene 
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could see him in order to not look suspicious-and then he lied about 
having heard some shots. That was vile, horrible, and inhumane. No 
doubt about it-everybody else is trying to save the Trooper, and he is 
calculating how to sneak off with the evidence. 
He lied when he was questioned, and he lied on the stand. He 
said an evil spirit made him do it! But if there is an evil spirit, it is 
Lonnie Weeks himself. He lies and he is selfish. He says he is sorry. 
Yes, but when he told you that he would die himself if it would bring 
Trooper Cavazos back to life he put a condition on it-he would die if 
he knew he would go to heaven! That was selfish too; that's not real 
remorse. 
Mr. Weeks burglarized a house, stole a car, \vas dealing drugs, 
bought a gun that killed a man in order to kill another man, killed a 
State Trooper who meant him no harm-and now he lies about it all. 
He is a selfish, dangerous liar, and I am asking you to impose the most 
serious penalty possible. He should be sentenced to death. 
Don't let Trooper Cavazos' death be in vain. He died working for 
you. Show all the other troopers that you stand behind them, and let 
some good come from this needless death. We ask you to impose the 
most serious penalty that the law allows for this most serious of crimes. 
650 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:627 
APPENDIX III 
DEFENDANT's LAWYER's REAsoNs FOR IMPosiNG A SENTENCE 
OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE 
I'm asking you to give my client a sentence less than death. Lon-
nie Weeks has admitted that he did a terrible thing. The victims of 
this crime have suffered, and there has been a lot of anger. I would 
never say there hasn't been a lot of hurt and anger, and I would never 
say that being poor justifies something like this. He has admitted do-
ing wrong, burglarizing a house and stealing a car and worst of all, 
shooting this Trooper. He isn't lying; he is telling you the truth. And 
he is not lying about dealing in crack cocaine; the only evidence that 
he did is that of a jailbird who was willing to testify in order to make it 
easier on himself. There is no physical evidence of drugs, and drugs 
are not the reason Lonnie Weeks took the car-he took it to visit his 
family, because he had missed the family reunion in Washington D.C. 
That was a stupid reason, but it isn't the reason the state is trying to 
make you believe. 
And it is not true that he repeatedly and deliberately shot at 
Trooper Cavazos. He told you what happened-Lonnie Weeks 
doesn't even know how many rounds he fired. And they were fired so 
fast that an eyewitness said he only heard two or three shots. And he 
didn't hit the Trooper in the center. These facts all add up to a man 
who panicked, not to an expert shot. And there is no evidence that he 
shot Trooper Cavazos when he was on the ground, and no evidence 
that the defendant bought the deadly bullets that were in the gun; 
they came with the gun. 
And the defendant didn't lie about going back to help the 
Trooper-he said he did it for his uncle. He could just have said 
"tough luck uncle, there isn't any evidence there against me." But he 
knew he had gotten his uncle involved in something he wasn't respon-
sible for, so he went back. 
He did lie when first arrested; and even when he confessed, he 
lied about where he had gotten the gun. But that was because he 
didn't ·want to get others in trouble for what he'd done. And he tried 
to be truthful with you on the stand. He admitted killing Trooper 
Cavazos; admitted breaking into the house; admitted stealing the car; 
admitted his one prior criminal conviction for selling marijuana. 
Mr. Weeks is not a very eloquent person. He doesn't speak very 
well, and he can't explain why he did this. I knew the state would 
bring up "The devil made me do it," but those were not Mr. Weeks's 
words, those were the state attorney's words, which Mr. Weeks then 
agreed to. It was the only way he could understand why he did this: 
He got out of touch with God, and then he did these evil acts. You 
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know he was a very religious person-his Sunday school teacher told 
you how he would sometimes cry in church, he was so moved by Scrip-
ture. He went to church, but he grew up in a very bad area, with 
drugs and shootings. And for eighteen years, he went to church, he 
was a star athlete, a man with real basketball talent, and he had no 
trouble with the law. He was an exception to the rule. And you heard 
all of those witnesses testify that they never knew Lonnie to do a vio-
lent act, not even to get in a fight, and they were shocked by what has 
happened. 
But then he went away from church, away from school, and he 
started hanging around ·with the wrong people. And he had been 
abandoned by his mother, who is a drug addict. She doesn't even 
care enough about him to see him now, knowing her son is on trial 
for his life. And that had an impact on him too. And when he got out 
of touch ·with the Lor:d, all of this happened. 
There is no excuse for what Lonnie Weeks did. He is repentant, 
and he admits that he has sinned, grievously sinned. He told you that 
if he could die and bring Trooper Cavazos back again, he would do it. 
He did put in a provision-that he would do it if he could go to 
heaven. Now maybe it would have sounded better if he said "1 would 
die to bring him back even if I would go to hell," but he told you the 
truth as he saw it. He is trying to find God again, and that is terribly 
hard under the circumstances. I pray ladies and gentlemen of the 
jury, that you will retum a sentence of life. 
652 CORNElL LAW REVIEW 
APPENDIX IV 
jURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Instruction 1 
[Vol. 85:627 
You are the judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses and 
the weight of the evidence. You may consider the appearance and 
manner of the witnesses on the stand, their intelligence, their oppor-
tunity for knowing the truth and for having observed the things about 
which they testified, their interest in the outcome of the case, their 
bias, and, if any have been shown, their prior inconsistent statements, 
or whether they have knowingly testified untruthfully as to any mate-
rial fact in the case. 
You may not arbitrarily disregard believable testimony of a wit-
ness. However, after you have considered all the evidence in the case, 
then you may accept or discard all or part of the testimony of a witness 
as you think proper. 
You are entitled to use your common sense injudging any testi-
mony. From these things and all the other circumstances of the case, 
you may determine which witnesses are more believable and weigh 
their testimony accordingly. 
Instruction 2 
You have convicted the defendant of an offense which may be 
punished by death. You must decide whether the defendant shall be 
sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment 
for life and a fine of a specific amount, but not more than 
$100,000.00. Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the State must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the following 
alternatives: 
1. That, after consideration of his history and background, there 
is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence 
that would constitute a continuing threat to society; or 
2. That his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously 
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved de-
pravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim beyond the 
minimum necessary to accomplish the act of murder. 
If you find from the evidence that the State has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt either of the two alternatives, and as to that alterna-
tive you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment of the de-
fendant at death or if you believe from all the evidence that the death 
penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defen-
dant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for life and a fine of a 
specific amount, but not more than $100,000.00. 
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If the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least 
one of the alternatives, then you shall fix the punishment of the de-
fendant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for life and a fine of a 
specific amount, but not more than $100,000.00. 
Instruction 3 
"Aggravated battery'' means a battery which, qualitatively and 
quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to ac-
complish an act of murder. 
Instruction 4 
Mitigation evidence is not evidence offered as an excuse for the 
crime of which you have found the defendant guilty. Rather, it is any 
evidence which in fairness may serve as a basis for a sentence less than 
death. The law requires your consideration of more than the bare 
facts of the crime. 
Mitigating circumstances may include, but not be limited to, any 
facts relating to the defendant's age, character, education, environ-
ment, life and background, or any aspect of the crime itself which 
might be considered extenuating or tend to reduce his moral culpa-
bility or make him less deserving of the extreme punishment of death. 
You must consider a mitigating circumstance if you find there is 
evidence to support it. The weight which you accord a particular miti-
gating circumstance is a matter of your judgment. 
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APPENDIX V 
Verdict Forms 
Verdict Form #1 
[Vol. 85:627 
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant, 
LONNIE "WEEKS, JR., GUILTY of CAPITAL MURDER and having 
unanimously found after consideration of his history and background, 
that there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, and 
having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unani-
mously fix his punishment at death. 
Verdict Form #2 
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant, 
LONNIE "WEEKS, JR., GUILTY of CAPITAL MURDER and having 
unanimously found that his conduct in committing the offense is out-
rageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved 
depravity of mind and/ or aggravated battery and having considered 
the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unanimously fix his punish-
ment at death. 
Verdict Form #3 
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant, 
LONNIE "WEEKS, JR., GUILTY of CAPITAL MURDER and having 
unanimously found after consideration of his history and background 
that there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, and 
having unanimously found that his conduct in committing the offense 
is outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it in-
volved depravity of mind and/ or aggravated battery and having con-
sidered the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unanimously fix his 
punishment at death. 
Verdict Form #4 
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant, 
LONNIE "WEEKS, JR., GUILTY of CAPITAL MURDER and having 
considered all of the evidence in aggravation and mitigation of such 
offense, fix his punishment at imprisonment for life. 
Verdict Form #5 
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant, 
LONNIE "WEEKS, JR., GUILTY of CAPITAL MURDER and having 
considered all of the evidence in aggravation and mitigation of such 
offense, fix his punishment at imprisonment for life and a fine of 
$ ____ , 
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APPENDIX VI 
WEEJi:J jURY QUESTION & COURT REPLIES 
WEEKS jury Question 
655 
If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is guilty of at least 1 of the 
alternatives, then is it our duty as a jury to issue the death penalty? or 
must we decide (even though he is guilty of one ( 1) of the alternatives) 
whether or not to issue the death penalty, or one of the life sentences? 
What is the [R]ule? Please clarify. 
Actual Reply 
See second paragraph of Instruction #2 (Beginning with "If you 
find from . . . etc.). 
Requested Reply 
Even if you find that the State has proved one or both of the 
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, you may give effect to 
the evidence in mitigation by sentencing the defendant to life in 
prison. 
